"Raju and Another Vs State of U.P." : Public Outrage vs. Legal Justice

The recent ruling in Raju and Another v. State of U.P. (Criminal Revision No. 1449 of 2024) by the Allahabad High Court has ignited a firestorm, most of whom including those from the legal fraternity have not read the judgments are outraged, with many decrying the decision to downgrade charges from attempted rape to aggravated sexual assault in a case involving an 11-year-old girl. The visceral reaction is understandable—any assault on a minor is abhorrent—but is this a case of judicial miscarriage, or are we witnessing a rush to judgment that risks undermining the rule of law? If this isn’t a public trial swayed by emotion, then what is? Do we want kangaroo courts dispensing vigilante justice, or should we defend the accused’s right to a fair legal process grounded in evidence and precedent? This blog examines the defense of the accused—Pawan, Akash, and Ashok—and argues that the High Court’s ruling reflects a principled stand against overreach, supported by legal reasoning and factual ambiguities.

Case Background

The incident occurred on November 10, 2021, in Kasganj, Uttar Pradesh. The complainant, the mother of an 11-year-old girl, alleged that the accused—Pawan, Akash, and Ashok—assaulted her daughter after offering her a ride on their motorcycle. According to her account, the accused groped the girl’s breasts, broke her pyjama string, and dragged her toward a culvert until her screams drew witnesses Satish and Bhurey, prompting the assailants to flee after brandishing a pistol. The trial court initially summoned Pawan and Akash under Section 376 IPC (rape) read with Section 18 of the POCSO Act (attempt), and Ashok under Sections 504 (insult) and 506 (criminal intimidation) IPC. The accused challenged this summoning order, leading to the Allahabad High Court’s revision on March 17, 2025, which reclassified the offense as aggravated sexual assault under Sections 9/10 of the POCSO Act and assault with intent to disrobe under Section 354B IPC.

Defense of the Accused

The defense rests on two pillars: factual inconsistencies casting doubt on the prosecution’s narrative and a legal argument that the ingredients of rape or attempted rape were not met.

Main points with supporting legal precedent.

1. Factual Inconsistencies and Motive for False Implication

The accused—Pawan (cousin of Akash), Akash, and Ashok (Akash’s father)—are closely related family members, a dynamic the defense leverages to question the plausibility of the alleged assault. More critically, they highlight a prior FIR lodged by Akash’s mother, Smt. Ranjana, on October 17, 2021 (Case Crime No. 209 of 2021), against four individuals—including Sukhveer, the complainant’s brother-in-law and the victim’s uncle—under Sections 354B, 504, and 506 IPC. This FIR, filed just weeks before the alleged incident, accused Sukhveer and others of molesting Ranjana and assaulting Akash. A chargesheet was filed in that case, intensifying enmity between the families.

Counterblast Argument: The defense contends that the present complaint, filed on November 11, 2021, was a retaliatory “counterblast” to shield Sukhveer from prosecution. This is bolstered by the improbability of the complainant allowing her daughter to ride with Akash—a relative of Ranjana, the informant in the prior case—amid such recent hostility. As the High Court noted in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273, courts must scrutinize complaints for mala fide intent, especially where prior enmity exists, to prevent misuse of criminal law.
Delay in FIR: The 12-hour delay in attempting to lodge the FIR (from 5:00 PM on November 10 to the next day) raises suspicion. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384, the Supreme Court cautioned that unexplained delays can undermine credibility unless justified by fear or coercion—none of which is evident here.
Witness Bias and Gaps: The prosecution relied on the complainant’s statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and witness Satish’s under Section 202 Cr.P.C., but Bhurey, another alleged witness, was not examined. Satish’s relation to the complainant (though unspecified, implied as familial) suggests bias. Moreover, no statement from the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded—or if recorded, not disclosed—leaving the complainant’s account uncorroborated by the minor herself. In State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash (2007) 12 SCC 381, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the victim’s statement in sexual offense cases, casting doubt on cases lacking such evidence.

2. Legal Threshold for Rape and Attempt

The High Court’s revision hinges on whether the alleged acts—groping, breaking the pyjama string, and dragging—constitute rape or an attempt under Section 376/511 IPC. The defense aligns with the court’s finding that they do not:

No Rape: Section 375 IPC requires penetration, however slight. No evidence suggests penetration occurred, ruling out rape. Precedent in Sakshi v. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 518 reinforces this strict definition.
No Attempt: Attempt under Section 511 IPC requires intent coupled with an act proximate to the offense, beyond mere preparation. The defense argues that the accused’s actions, while deplorable, stopped short of demonstrating intent to rape “at all events.” In Koppula Venkat Rao v. State of A.P. (2004) 3 SCC 602, the Supreme Court held that intent must be inferred from overt acts clearly advancing toward the crime—here, no undressing of the accused or victim occurred, and the culvert dragging lacks specificity linking it to rape. The court cited Rex v. James Lloyd (1836) for this proximity test.
Correct Classification: The reclassification to Section 354B IPC (assault with intent to disrobe) and Sections 9/10 POCSO (aggravated sexual assault) aligns with the evidence: physical contact with sexual intent, sans penetration or proximate attempt. In Satish v. State of Haryana (2021), the Supreme Court clarified that touching without penetration falls under sexual assault, not penetrative assault, supporting this downgrade.

3. Public Outrage vs. Rule of Law

Public fury demands harsher charges, but the defense warns against letting emotion override evidence. If this becomes a public trial swayed by outrage, we risk kangaroo courts where guilt is presumed, not proven. The presumption of innocence, enshrined in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1962) AIR SC 605, protects the accused from mob justice. The High Court’s ruling reflects judicial restraint, ensuring punishment fits the proven crime—still severe under POCSO (up to seven years)—without overstepping legal boundaries.

Conclusion: A Defense Grounded in Law, Not Sentiment

The accused in Raju and Another v. State of U.P. are not saints; their alleged actions, if true, are reprehensible. Yet, the defense compellingly argues that this case is tainted by vengeance, riddled with evidentiary gaps, and mischarged under rape provisions. The Allahabad High Court’s revision upholds a fundamental tenet: punishment must match the crime proven, not the crime imagined. Precedents like Arnesh Kumar and Koppula Venkat Rao affirm this approach, guarding against judicial overreach fueled by public clamor. If we abandon this for populist verdicts, we trade justice for chaos. Is the outrage justified? Perhaps emotionally—but legally, the defense stands on solid ground. The alternative is a slippery slope to lawlessness.

Original order of the Hon'ble High Court